SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL BASES OF STATUS SUPPORT IN PUERTO RICO

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ABSTRACT

The debate over the final political status of Puerto Rico has raged for over a century with important implication for the Island’s public and for U.S. policy makers. Despite the strong emphasis on the “status issue” in Puerto Rico, little empirical research has been done in this area. This article examines the main theories, hypotheses and speculations on status choice, and submits them to empirical testing using multinomial logit equations. The results show significant differences in ideology and social groups between supporters of the three main status options.

Keywords: Puerto Rico, ideology, status (debate over), independence, statehood, autonomism, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (ELA)

SINOPSIS

El debate sobre el status final de Puerto Rico se ha dado por más de un siglo con importantes implicaciones para los habitantes de la isla y para los Estados Unidos. A pesar del fuerte énfasis en el asunto del status, en Puerto Rico, se han realizado pocos trabajos empíricos en esta área. Este artículo examina las teorías, hipótesis y especulaciones principales en cuestión de status y las somete a prueba empírica usando ecuaciones de logia multinomial. Los resultados indican que hay diferencias significativas en ideología y grupos sociales entre los seguidores de las tres fórmulas principales de status.

Palabras clave: Puerto Rico, ideología, status (debate sobre), independencia, estadidad, autonomismo, Estado Libre Asociado (ELA)

RÉSUMÉ

Le débat sur le statut politique final de Porto Rico s’est fait sentir pour plus d’un siècle avec d’importantes répercussions...
Ever since the United States acquired Puerto Rico by virtue of the Treaty of Paris in 1898, three main alternatives for the final political status of Puerto Ricans have been debated by the U.S. President, Congress, and the Island's elite and general public. These are: an independent state, a U.S. state, or some degree of autonomy (a continuation of the current Commonwealth status established in 1952). Even though this is a fundamental issue in Puerto Rican political life, there is little empirical research supporting solid theoretical knowledge of who favors which status alternative and why. Much of the work in this area has been either theoretical or purely speculative. Here we begin to address this gap.

In this paper we investigate empirically the social and ideological bases of status choice. Using multinomial logit equations we develop a model of social and ideological choice. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we will focus on the ideological determinants of status choice in order to try to establish some empirical relationships between political ideas and status choice. These relationships will be guided by the theories and speculations that have been put forth on this subject. Then, we will look at how the social variables interact with ideology in a full model of political choice. In this way we will test which hypotheses are supported by the data. Finally, we will address the debate of how similar or
different Puerto Ricans who support each of the three ideologies really are. In the end we hope to improve the theoretical and empirical knowledge on why some Puerto Ricans choose to support statehood, some Commonwealth and some independence.

It is important to note that the results that the equations provide are the mean effect of each variable controlling for all other variables included in the equation. This means that their impact is in its distilled form, free from the effects of all the other variables. This often leads to impact percentages that are less spectacular than those seen in bivariate tables. In that case, the effect of the independent variables may be also taking into account the effects of other variables, and thus the inflated impact.

Before we continue, two important clarifications are in order. First, a word must be said about the historical context in which this work unfolds. It must be viewed in the context of 1991, the year when the data was collected. Thus, although some issues such as Communism might be somewhat dated today, they were relevant at the time. Even though the iron curtain had already fallen, Communism still casted a shadow on Island politics, especially since it had been a part of the political discourse for so long. And although several years have passed, most of the political realities related to status remain as valid today as they were then.

Second, Puerto Rican political reality is more complex than to say that all supporters of statehood or Commonwealth or independence are the same (within each of the alternatives). Like all ideological movements, there are variations within each theme. For example, some supporters of statehood want a full integration to the United States while others are more “cultural nationalists”. Similarly there are variations within those that support Commonwealth, ranging from those who want much stronger ties to the United States, to those desiring to keep the status quo without any change, to those who support a much more autonomous free association. There is also variety within the independence movement. No mass ideological movement anywhere is completely homogeneous.
The purpose of this study is to assess the mean effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable of status choice. It is not our goal to study the variations within each of the three alternatives. Such goal is important research in itself, but outside the boundaries of our investigation. Furthermore, the core beliefs of those who support each of the status options are, to say the least, similar. Although there may be supporters of statehood who want an “estadidad jibara” (with Puerto Rican culture), and those who want an unconditional annexation to the United States, in the end, they are all supporters of statehood, and all want closer economic, political and cultural ties to that nation. The same applies to those who support Commonwealth and those who support independence. This research and its results must be viewed and analyzed within this scope.

Introduction

In 1898, at the end of the Spanish-American War, the United States acquired Puerto Rico from Spain under the Treaty of Paris. Since then, the question of what kind of relationship Puerto Rico should have with the United States has been passionately debated in almost every instance of Island politics. This fundamental question of Puerto Rican politics is what is commonly called the “status issue”.

Between 1898 and 1900, Puerto Rico was governed by the U.S. military. In 1900 the U.S. Congress approved the Foraker Act and in 1917 the Jones Act, both of which established civilian governments with a very limited degree of local participation. In 1952 Puerto Ricans adopted their own constitution under the Estado Libre Asociado (ELA). This allowed the Island a larger level of autonomous rule, and freed all leadership positions, from the governor down to the city halls of its municipalities, to be elective, not appointed. This gave Puerto Ricans effective access and control over the local government, both in terms of being candidates themselves or of voting for elective officials. Commonwealth (or ELA) is the current political status, which has been ratified by two
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Throughout the 20th Century, irrespective of the different statutory and constitutional changes, the political debate revolved around three main so called “status alternatives” which offered different solutions to the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States: federal statehood, autonomy (Commonwealth from 1952 on), and independence. Each status option is closely related to each of the Island’s three main political parties. The Partido Popular Democrático (Popular Democratic Party, PPD), founded in 1938, was the architect of the current Commonwealth status in 1952, and is its main defender today. It won the 1952, 1956, 1960, 1964, 1972, 1984, 1988, 2000, and 2004 gubernatorial elections. The Partido Nuevo Progresista (New Progressive Party, PNP), founded in 1967, argues that Puerto Rico should become the 51st U.S. state. It won the 1968, 1976, 1980, 1992 and 1996 gubernatorial elections. The Partido Independentista Puertorriqueno (Puerto Rican Independence Party, PIP), founded in 1946, as its name suggests, defends independence for Puerto Rico, and has not won a gubernatorial election.

The political status issue clearly is the main cleavage that divides the Puerto Rican society, and thus the parties and the political debate revolve around it. In the dataset that we used in this study, for example, 86 percent of those who identified themselves as supporters of the PPD also supported Commonwealth, 92 percent of those identified with the PNP supported statehood and 94 percent of those identified with the PIP supported independence (these are high percentages, even though, as we will see, the status options were calculated differently that the traditional measure). It is important to note that precisely because of this theoretically and empirically close association between the political parties and status preference, partisanship could not be used in the statistical analyses as an independent variable. Since party and status preference are almost the two sides of the same coin, we would be using nearly identical concepts on both sides of the equal sign, which would add nothing to the understanding of status choice (not to
mention a problem with multicollinearity). As Anderson (1988) put it: “[The] Status defines the [political] parties and how they are constituted.”

Given the importance of the status debate, we were surprised to find that very little has been done in the way of empirical studies of status choice. Studies (at least publicly available) using survey data are virtually non-existent. In the midst of this lack of empirical knowledge, several suppositions, hypotheses and theories have been proposed about how status choice is actually shaped.

We take as a starting point what we have called the “traditional perspective” of status choice. This perspective, as described here, does not come from a coherent theoretical framework or a single author as such, but rather a collection of written works, mostly analyses by pundits, and general public discussions. We call it the traditional perspective because it is the one that has been present in the political discourse for generations: that supporters of the three main status choices are different, because the offerings of the three status choices are different. This can be clearly seen, for example in Romero Barceló’s famous book La estadidad es para los pobres (1974), or in the newspaper columns of pundits and commentators, or perhaps in many everyday discussions of the status debate, or in the parties’ presentations to Congress when the status debate is discussed.

Thus, this perspective leads us to expect significant differences between those that prefer different status alternatives. In general, we hypothesize that these differences fall in two areas: security and national pride. Those who are more inclined to favor integration to the United States should put greater emphasis on security issues, such as economic and political safety. The logical argument from this perspective is that a stronger tie with the U.S. ought to better protect Puerto Rico from threats, economic and political turmoil, hunger, and the general political upheavals that have historically affected Latin America.

The traditional perspective of status politics argues that those who want independence from the U.S. tend to put more emph-
sis on national pride issues. The differences between these two visions ought to clearly show themselves in both the social composition and the ideological preferences of the status alternatives supporters. Most of the political analysis has been concentrated on working within this “traditional” view of status choice.

More recently, Ángel Israel Rivera (1996, 2001) has advanced the study of status politics by studying in detail the different options and looking at their differences and similarities. His main contribution, though, has been the development of the concept of autonomy, how it relates to the three options, and how it can be applied in a way in which the debate can be confronted head on and perhaps solved. Although he studies the sociology of the status options and their supporters, Rivera’s work on autonomism is fundamentally theoretical (see especially his 2001 work).

In the process of developing his theoretical arguments on autonomism, Rivera (1996) discusses in some detail what he calls “spiritual autonomism”. He defines this concept in an endnote to chapter 9, where he states that: “The phrase “Puerto Rican spiritual autonomism” (autonomismo espiritual boricua) must be understood in the context of this essay. That is, besides autonomism as a political and ideological current consciously admitted—which some Puerto Ricans accept and others do not—most of us Puerto Ricans are “autonomists of spirit”. In other words our deepest attitudes, unconscious or conscious, and our most intimate feelings and preferences (gustos) make us behave in ways that, in practice, fit better with a political condition that, at the same time, accepts our distinct national identity and our capacity for self government, and in a pragmatic way to a larger entity that allows us all of the above, but at the same time, gives the country [Puerto Rico] economic advantages (conveniencias) and the provision of a wide range of vital options beyond the confines of the island’s territory (p. 316, translation ours)”

From this concept flows his phrase “all Puerto Ricans are autonomists” (Rivera 1996). Taken in this context, autonomy from the U.S. is seen by most people as a convenient middle ground, in
which Puerto Ricans can place national pride, and economic and political security side by side. This is not necessarily a conscious decision, as he explains in the quote above, but rather a state of being. He argues that at heart all Puerto Ricans are autonomists because, in general, they all feel proud to be Puerto Ricans—above being “Americans”—and because all value a certain level of security, especially economic security. This is seen, for example, in the concept of “estadidad jibara” (Statehood Puerto Rican style) in which supporters of statehood can comfortably mix being culturally Puerto Rican while receiving federal transfers, or in the statehood’s leaders defense of English and Spanish, while doing little to improve the teaching of the former in schools.

An interesting example provided by Rivera was the 1996 Fourth of July celebration, in which most of the speakers barely mentioned the subject, preferring to focus their speeches on the local accomplishments of the pro-statehood PNP administration (the speeches being in Spanish). Of course, the musical event to celebrate the independence of the United States was provided by famous salsa group El Gran Combo, whose musicians sported a Puerto Rican (not American) flag on their shirts and obviously sang in Spanish.

This argument also applies to supporters of independence, who besides supporting this option also like the advantages that they receive from their association with the United States, such as their U.S. citizenship and economic security. As Rivera states, “And do you know which are the aspects of the current relations with the United States that supporters of independence like best according to a scientific survey we carried out in the University of Puerto Rico? You guessed it! Economic aids, citizenship [U.S.] and the passport! Supporters of independence? Please (Ay Bendito)! Pure myth! We are all autonomists! (1996:360. Exclamations and italics in the original).”

Rivera’s argument is of course more complex and refined, and he carefully describes and analyzes the differences and nuances within each of the status options. Some supporters of Common-
wealth are closer to statehood, for example, while others are closer to independence. Similar variations exist within the other two formulas. In the end, however, his concept of “spiritual autonomism” centers on the argument that all Puerto Ricans, supporters of Commonwealth, statehood or independence, like the advantages that they derive from Puerto Rico’s association with the United States, while feeling genuinely Puerto Rican and prizing the local autonomy that they have. For the purpose of this work, then, we call this spiritual autonomy concept the “autonomy perspective”. From this perspective we can hypothesize that there will be few significant differences, especially ideological differences, between those who support the three traditional choices: statehood, Commonwealth, or independence, at least when compared with the traditional perspective.

Two comments are in order before proceeding. First, we must caution the reader that it is us, not Rivera, who infer the hypotheses mentioned above and used throughout this article; and second, that the spiritual autonomy concept and its arguments are but a small part of the wider, highly developed discussion of autonomy which is at the heart of Rivera’s work. For the purpose of this work, the “autonomy perspective” serves the function of a tool with which we can formulate some working hypotheses and interpret the equations’ results.

Data and Method

In order to explore the relationships between the social and ideological components of status choice we have adopted a three-stage approach. First, we will discuss the theoretical relevance of the different ideological variables that may affect status choice. These will be divided in two groups: security variables and pride variables. Then we will include these variables in a multinomial logit equation to see the impact each one has on status choice while holding all others constant. This will be a test of the pure ideological model. Then we will discuss the importance of social variables and join them with the ideological variables in a full
model of ideological choice. The reason to construct a simple ideological model first is that in the Puerto Rican literature on politics, ideological variables are often treated separately from social variables. By adding the social variables in a full model we can explore the changes that the simple ideological model undergoes when viewed in a wider perspective. From this we will try to construct an explanation of social and ideological status choice that has both theoretical and empirical foundations. We will also try to provide empirical evidence in the “traditional” and “autonomist” perspective.

The main source of data for these analyses comes from an Island-wide survey conducted in 1991 by the Hispania Research Corporation. Because the dataset is from 1991, we will make references to the social and political situation of the early nineties and before. Although we were not able to locate more recent, quality, publicly available survey data, this should not pose much of a problem since the main bases of the status debate remain the same. Also, the variables used to create the model, except perhaps for Communism—which we include in the equations because it was relevant at the time—remain the same and are not tied to specific time events (as the evaluation of a political leader might be). Status preference is also believed to be a stable long-term preference (Barreto and Eagle 2000).

To construct our dependent variable, we combined three separate variables on status choice. Instead of asking the traditional question of which status alternative did the respondent preferred: statehood, independence, or Commonwealth, the Hispania survey showed respondents a series of scales running from 1 through 10. Respondents were asked how much they liked or disliked (1 being strongly dislikes and 10 strongly likes) each status alternative according to the scale. For each case status preference was determined by the status scale with the highest number. Those who gave a response of undecided, did not know or did not answer in the three scales were removed from the analysis. Those who selected the same number for each on the three scales (three way ties) were also removed. Finally, those who gave the three scales...
a very low score (4 or less) were eliminated, since we took this to mean that they did not have a clear status preference (although these numbered only 7). The final sample size was composed of 964 respondents, with 41.2 percent favoring Commonwealth, 41.8 favoring statehood, and 7.0 percent favoring independence.\footnote{Ramos 1987; Rivera 1996}

**Ideological Influences on Status Choice**

Both, the traditional status and the autonomist perspectives, as described earlier, state that national pride and security issues will be important ideological variables in understanding status choice. The way in which these variables are related to status choice, however, is very different in each view. The traditional status perspective suggests that supporters of statehood will give maximum importance to security concerns, while supporters of independence will give more weight to national pride issues (Ramos 1987). The autonomy perspective leads us to expect that security and national pride will be important to supporters of all status options (Rivera 1996). Puerto Ricans are proud to be who they are, but they also like the security (especially economic security) that comes from being part of the United States. We used two groups of ideological variables, one that measured fear and security, and another that measured national pride.

Viewed from the autonomist perspective, supporters of independence, statehood, and Commonwealth are similar. They are all nationalists, feeling a strong pride of being Puerto Rican, while rejecting many defining characteristics of being Americans. The archetypal example is that, in international basketball competitions, the traditional enemy of the Puerto Rican team is the United States. In the heat of competition, the most nationalist supporters of independence, and the most pro-American supporters of statehood favor the Puerto Rican team over the American team. Rivera (1996) argues that most supporters of statehood support this status because of the economic security it brings, not because most “estadistas” (supporters of statehood) truly feel American.
On the other hand, many supporters of independence, he argues, send their children to colleges in the U.S., using federal financial aid in the process, and also like their American citizenship, especially when they travel. Proof of this, argues the author, is the fact that only a handful of "independentistas" (supporters of independence) have ever tried to renounce their American citizenship. They may be very nationalist, but they like the security blanket that the association with the U.S. provides. Rivera (1996:144) summarizes it in a phrase "Puerto Rican with the heart, American with the stomach (Puertorriqueño de corazón, estadounidense con el estómago)."

The traditional perspective of status politics, as explained at the beginning, takes a very different view, one that is more strongly based on social groupings. To put it simply, supporters of statehood do so, first because they need, physically or psychologically, the security that an association with the U.S. provides. This security is reflected on two main areas, economic security and fear of political instability and Communism (keeping in mind the survey was done in 1991). Second, supporters of statehood, this perspective argues, feel more pride in being Americans, and thus, less pride in Puerto Rican institutions and culture. Supporters of independence do not need to put much of a premium on security: they come mostly from the elite, as we will show later. They feel a strong pride in all things Puerto Rican. Supporters of Commonwealth, of course, occupy a middle ground, comfortably mixing pride and the need for security.

In the case of the autonomy perspective, then, we should find no significant differences in the pride and security variables between the three groups. In contrast, in the traditional perspective there should be no significant differences between supporters of statehood and Commonwealth on security issues, but there should be differences on pride issues. They both feel a need for security, which is why they want to keep their association to the United States, but give culture a different emphasis, which is probably why many supporters of Commonwealth reject statehood. Using
the same reasoning we expect that there should be no significant differences between supporters of Commonwealth and supporters of independence in pride issues but there would be differences in security issues.

In order to test these hypotheses, we used three security variables and three pride variables. We took care to avoid variables that were part of specific partisan debates, and instead chose variables that were more directly related to the general status debates. All variables were originally in a five point agree/disagree scale. The ends were collapsed to form a three-point scale (Strongly agree/Agree, Neither agrees nor disagrees, Disagrees/Strongly disagrees). The three security variables were: fear of losing the U.S. citizenship, fear of communism, and the security provided to Puerto Rico by the U.S. (see appendix 1 for original wording).

Fear of losing the U.S. citizenship has been a central issue to supporters of statehood. Some of their leaders argue that the American citizenship that Puerto Ricans have is statutory (granted by the U.S. Congress in the Jones Act) and thus, can be repealed. The only way that such citizenship can be secure, the argument goes, is by becoming a U.S. state. The political discourse from several generations of pro-statehood and Commonwealth political leaders has stated that the U.S. citizenship is the basis of almost everything positive and good in Puerto Rico. Evidently it is a necessary requirement for a federal state, and one of the fundamental pillars (to repeat the phrase often used by political leaders) of the Commonwealth’s relationship with the United States. A recent popular bumper sticker among statehood supporters states (in Spanish, of course!): “American Citizenship: Where would we be without it?” Therefore we expect that the data will show a strong attachment for the U.S. citizenship from followers of these two status options.

Communism was also an important issue in 1991. Given the geographical proximity of Cuba to Puerto Rico, and the large amount of Cuban refugees in Puerto Rico, the fear of Communism had been hyped repeatedly for several decades (Ramos 1987). In a
similar fashion, the issue of protection by the United States should also tap into the security feeling. This protection has been used often in the political discourse as a source of security for Puerto Ricans against communism and the political instability that existed in much of Latin America through the end of the 1980's.

Pride was measured with three variables: language, economic, and Olympic pride (see appendix 1 for original wording). Language has been one of the hottest issues associated with the status debate. Supporters of independence and some supporters of Commonwealth have long argued that Spanish should be the main language of the island, instead of Spanish and English. Leaders in the statehood movement continually point to the importance of English in business and world culture. Rivera (1996) notes that this emphasis is not followed by a love for English, quite to the contrary most Puerto Ricans dislike it calling it “el difícil” (the difficult one). Thus, instead of using a measure of whether Puerto Rico should have one or two official languages, the measure we used refers to whether or not respondents “liked” to speak English. In this way we tapped into the pride dimension of language more effectively and avoided the partisan debate.

Pride in the Olympic Team has been a perennial and important point of debate. Opponents of statehood often point out that if Puerto Rico were a U.S. state, it could not have an independent Olympic Team. On the other hand, the basketball example mentioned above suggests a collective sense of pride on this topic.

Finally, pride in the contribution of Puerto Ricans to the economy should be important especially in view of the impact of American private investment in the economy and the large federal transfers through social programs. Because of the large scale investment by American companies some local entrepreneurs have been displaced and may associate economic self-reliance and pride with more political autonomy or independence (González 1991). Leaders from the independence movement have sometimes rallied in favor of economic self reliance and economic pride and against what some perceive as the lazy reliance on federal
transfers. In sum, economic pride should be another dimension of pride in what Puerto Ricans can achieve, together with language or sportsmanship pride, thus influencing status choice.

To test the ideological model we used a multinomial logit equation. In the equation, we specified the comparison base of the dependent variable as the Commonwealth status alternative, and compared statehood and independence against it. We chose Commonwealth as the base because it is the current status under which all Puerto Ricans live and because it will allow us a better test of the traditional or autonomist perspectives.12

The results in Table 1 show the purely ideological model. The autonomist perspective suggests that we would expect few ideological differences between the two groups, either in security or pride issues. The traditional perspective would show significant differences between groups. Pride would be most important in distinguishing statehood and Commonwealth, since both would prize the security that comes from being a part of the United States. Security would be the main difference between Commonwealth and independence, since both should have similar levels of pride in Puerto Rican symbols.

The equations show that there are eight ideological variables that are statistically significant when comparing statehood and independence with Commonwealth. Five ideological variables were significant when comparing statehood and Commonwealth, with the pride variables in general having the largest impact. All other variables being equal, those who were afraid of loosing their U.S. citizenship, and who thought that the U.S. protects Puerto Rico were 18 and 13 percent more likely to support statehood than Commonwealth. In terms of pride, those who liked to speak English (which does not measure the actual ability to speak the language) were 24 percent more likely to support statehood than Commonwealth. On the other hand those who were proud of the Puerto Rican Olympic team and of their contribution to the island’s economy were 15 and 30 percent less likely to support that status option versus Commonwealth.
Table 1.

IDEOLOGICAL MODEL OF STATUS CHOICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Status Preference</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Percentage Impact</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Standard Error)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Standard Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.80133</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>0.37273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.57633)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.0751)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Citizenship</td>
<td>0.80009**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.2114**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24030)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.34463)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communism</td>
<td>0.23756</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.1766**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.22547)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.34964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Protection</td>
<td>0.60236*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.0736**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32547)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.39288)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>1.0480**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.35645E-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21132)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.35584)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Pride</td>
<td>-0.66288**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.19027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23474)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.47500)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Olympic Pride</td>
<td>-1.4747**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.47433)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.0197)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

N=802  Χ²=162.73  Sig.=0.0000

** Significant to p<.01 or better  * Significant to p<.10 or better

Source: Hispania Survey

While there were also three statistically significant variables that separate supporters of independence and Commonwealth, the emphasis was the reverse of the estadistas. All three significant variables relate to security issues: citizenship, fear of communism, and the security offered by the U.S. No pride variables were significant. Holding everything else equal, those who were not afraid of losing their American citizenship or of Communism were 14 and 13 percent more likely to favor independence over Commonwealth. Those who thought that the United States protects Puerto Rico were 13 percent less likely to choose independence.

The ideological differences point to a marked difference between estadistas and independentistas when compared to estadolibristas (supporters of Commonwealth). The main thrust of the differences between supporters of statehood and supporters of Commonwealth is pride, although security is also an important issue. The autonomy perspective suggests that in general...
all Puerto Ricans like their American citizenship, do not like to communicate in English, and are proud of their Olympic Team. As we saw above, there are statistically (and substantively) significant differences on these issues between *estadistas* and *estadolibristas*, even while simultaneously controlling for all other variables.

In the case of supporters of independence, they share similar levels of national pride with Commonwealth supporters, but the latter are more concerned with security issues. The size of the impact would point to somewhat similar ideological opinions between supporters of Independence and supporters of Commonwealth. In all, these results fit well with the predictions that the traditionalist perspective generates, especially in relation to the supporters of the two main status options. Before reaching any final conclusion, however, we must merge both the ideological and the social models together as some of the statistical significance may be due to social variables.

**Social Bases of Status Choice**

The debate on status choice predicts that there will be significant differences between social groups and each of the three status choices. The differences between statehood and Commonwealth should be more of degree than kind, however. The reason for this can be understood by briefly looking at the origins of the two largest political parties, the Popular Democratic Party (PPD) and the New Progressive Party (PNP). In contrast to the United States, both main parties in Puerto Rico had similar welfare state ideologies in 1991 and both had explicitly or implicitly included it in their platforms (PNP, 1988; PPD, 1988).

The theme of social justice fueled the creation of the PPD and brought it to victory in the 1940 legislative election. Under the leadership of Luis Muñoz Marín, the party’s main focus was on the peasants, the poor, and on the economically displaced section of the old landed class, such as intellectuals (Quintero 1974, 1976, 1985; Ortiz 1985; Navas 1985). Their slogan, “Pan, Tierra y Libertad,” (Bread, Land and Liberty) appealed directly
to these lower class constituencies. The new PPD put so much emphasis on their social justice theme that they even put aside the perennial status problem. Solving the country’s social inequalities became their main goal (Dietz 1989). To achieve its objectives, the PPD had to mobilize those in the lower classes, especially the peasants, since an important part of the economic reforms was land redistribution. Originally, the PPD’s development plan was based on “national” development by “native” capital. By the end of the 1940s, however, the emphasis changed to industrialization by private external investment, mainly American (Dietz 1989). Notwithstanding, the emphasis on a strong social safety net was kept.

In time, however, the PPD’s own success in transforming the Puerto Rican economy brought about an end to its hege-monistic position in the political landscape. First, industrialization by American companies and American capital in urban areas increased the attachment of those living from such industries to the U.S. Second, the emphasis on industrialization brought a decline of agriculture as the single most important economic activity (Silvestrini and Luque de Sánchez 1987; Scarano 1993). Third, as a consequence of the rise of industrialization and the decline of agriculture, a large migration to the cities took place. By the 1970s, most of the Puerto Rican population was no longer rural (Silvestrini and Luque de Sánchez 1987). Finally, this new urbanization created new destitute classes and new problems such as crime and drugs (Martínez Fernández 1986; Dietz 1989). These new realities of the late sixties and early seventies substantially weakened the original coalition bases of the PPD, mainly because they no longer existed.

In the late sixties, the newly created Partido Nuevo Progresista (New Progressive Party, PNP), under the leadership of Luis A. Ferré, sought to capitalize on these new social and economic pressures. In their campaign, supporters of the PNP targeted and mobilized these new urban marginalized groups. This is what Anderson (1988) called the “urban populism” of the PNP. The
PNP unexpectedly won the 1968 elections (Martínez Fernández 1986). Not accidentally, the PNP’s triumph was concentrated in urban areas, while the PPD kept its hold on rural areas (Tribunal Electoral 1969). To these new groups, namely the urban poor, the PNP and its statehood ideology seemed to be more in tune with their interests than the old PPD.

The windfall of American welfare dollars by the mid-1970s definitely helped the PNP’s cause. Here was proof, according to pro-statehood leaders, that the statehood was the choice for the poor (Ramos 1987). Statehood provided economic stability and security for the masses. In fact, the PNP slogan was (and still is) “Statehood, Security, and Progress”. The distribution of welfare transfers from the government, mainly federal programs and moneys, skyrocketed by the mid-1970s (Dietz 1989).13

Not to be undone, the PPD has repeatedly asked for parity with the fifty states in the extension of welfare programs whenever the situation has arisen (Meléndez Vélez 1998).14 During the 1989-1990 Congressional status initiative, the PPD asked for parity with the other 50 states in receiving federal aids.15 The PNP leadership made the same petition (García Passalacqua and Rivera Lugo 1990).

In terms of social groups, then, we should expect that those who belong to social groups to which security is a major concern would support statehood more strongly. These are mainly those who are poor, have little education, receive aids such as food stamps, are out of the workforce (either unemployed or retired), and who are not young (thus have a marriage and children, or are retired and dependent on pensions). The expectation is that the social situation of these groups puts the issue of security at high priority, especially since they may depend on government goods and services to provide their basic needs, or because they lack some basic skills to get good jobs or are in a stage in their lives where security is more important than risk (García Passalacqua 1993.)

Some researchers have also suggested that the upper income
and upper middle class groups will also favor statehood because they believe that it is thanks to the United States that they have achieved their economic positions. This is especially true of the “intermediary” groups that serve as links between American economic interests and the Puerto Rican population (Maldonado Denis 1969; Quintero Rivera 1986). These are people such as managers of K-Mart stores and businessmen at import/export companies. Comparatively, these professionals receive very good wages.

On the other hand, given the PPD’s history and its leader’s struggle and insistence parity with the rest of the U.S. in terms of federal transfers, the social group differences between statehood and Commonwealth support should be more of degree than kind. Perhaps the most significant difference should be in income, with supporters of statehood coming more from lower and upper income groups and supporters of Commonwealth from middle income groups. Commonwealth supporters should also be less concentrated in urban areas in contrast to supporters of statehood.

In contrast to the differences between statehood and Commonwealth, the differences between supporters of independence and the other two formulas should be more of kind than degree. Because independence was purposefully associated with hunger and misery by the leaders of the other two formulas and by previous governments in power, some see it as problematic in terms of economic security. Thus, we expect that its supporters should belong to social groups whose economic security is more solid. For example they will belong to higher economic and educational groups (García Passalacqua 1993; Maldonado Denis 1969). Finally, they will probably be of a younger age groups than supporters of the other two formulas, which would make security issues less important to them, in contrast to people who have children or are retired.

We used nine variables related to social groups. Table 2 displays the variables and their relationship to the three status
choices. To measure the impact of resources, and thus the relevance of security on status choice we used four variables: income, education, urban poverty, and receiving food stamps. Income was measured as two dummy variables: middle income and high income, using low income as a base. The reason for this is that this resource may not be linearly related to status choice. For example, Maldonado Dennis (1993) argued that the middle classes will support independence at higher rates than the poor and the rich. Education, another resource variable, was measured as a continuous variable.

In light of the debate about the importance of those who received food stamps and other federal aids or that live in public housing projects in favoring statehood, we included them as resource variables, although they also have a strong political and social component. Although the questionnaire did not ask respondents if they lived in public housing projects, we created an interaction effect for those who were poor and urban. The dependence of the urban poor and those that received food stamps on federal transfers and on the urban industrial economy directly linked to the U.S. may have created a feeling of dependence or attachment to the U.S., thus pushing them to support statehood as a means of solidifying this political attachment (Benítez 1991; García Passalacqua and Heine 1991; Maldonado Dennis 1969; Quintero Rivera 1986).

Finally, we used five control variables: age, gender, area of residence, place of birth, and having lived in the United States. As we mentioned before, the party that supports Commonwealth had agrarian origins, while support for statehood has been associated to urban settings. Independence has also been described as an urban phenomenon, although this is probably due to a spurious relationship with high income and education. In the United States, research has linked gender with different economic evaluations (Welch and Hibbings 1992), different attitudes to issues and ideology (Gilens 1988), different partisan defection rates (Wirls 1986), and different influencing personal and competence evaluations.
Thus, it is theoretically possible that women in Puerto Rico may be viewing the whole political situation from different perspectives than men.

We hypothesize that those who were born outside of Puerto Rico would support statehood more often than those who were born in the Island. We expect this because those born in the U.S. and moved to Puerto Rico will probably want to keep close ties to the U.S. Those who were born in other countries most probably moved to the Island looking for better economic opportunities, such as the many Dominicans that emigrate legally and illegally each year to look for jobs in Puerto Rico. The political and economic relationship between Puerto Rico and the U.S. is probably credited for the better living conditions in their new home. Puerto Rico also offers the added incentive of being a gateway to the U.S., since no visas or passports are needed to travel from the Island to the U.S. Ideological considerations also lead us to expect that some foreign-born respondents will favor statehood. Many Cubans left Cuba fleeing Communism. They have long been noted for their strong support for statehood and the PNP (Cobas and Duany 1995; Barreto and Eagle 2000). These immigrants, especially their leaders, have publicly and vocally displayed a strong attachment to the statehood ideal and a marked aversion to independence.

Finally, we controlled for having lived in the United States for at least six months. This experience may influence opinions on the status issue in opposite directions. Some who have lived in the United States may be less inclined to favor statehood in favor of Commonwealth or independence. The Puerto Rican community in New York and Chicago has long ties to independence. In addition, possible discrimination towards Puerto Ricans in the mainland may push them against integration to the U.S. On the other hand a positive living experience, better and higher paying jobs, or a better education obtained there may influence some to favor statehood over the other status options.

Having discussed the different social variables and their pos-
sible relation to status preference, we can turn to see how each affects status choice in a full model.

**Social and Ideological influences on Status Choice: The Full Model**

The results of the social and ideological model are displayed on Table 2. At first glance it can be seen that there are few changes to the pure ideological model when it is combined with the social variables.

With respect to statehood, four social and all six ideological variables were significant. The data shows that those who have lived outside Puerto Rico, urban dwellers and those that received food stamps, on average, tended to favor statehood over Commonwealth. Controlling for all the social and ideological variables, those who had lived outside the island were 7 percent more likely to favor statehood versus Commonwealth. In the same line, those that lived in urban centers and who received food stamps were 8 and 7 percent more likely, respectively, to support statehood. Thus, in terms of these social groups, these variables behave as predicted. More to the point, statehood is an urban phenomenon that receives support from food stamps recipients and those that have lived in the U.S., when compared to Commonwealth. Somewhat more perplexing is that women tend to favor Commonwealth over statehood, ceteris paribus. Although the impact is not particularly large, it is consistent, also occurring in the case of independence.

Ideologically, all security and pride variables achieved statistical significance. Also, the combined average impact of the pride variables is somewhat larger in the case of pride variables, than in the case of security variables. Fear of losing the U.S. citizenship, fear of communism, and the security provided by the United States tilted the balance in favor of statehood (18, 9 and 12 percent respectively). In the same line, those who said that they liked to speak English were 19 percent more likely to favor statehood over Commonwealth, as were those less proud of their economic
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</th>
<th>State Preference</th>
<th>INDEPENDENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient (Standard Error)</td>
<td>Percentage Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient (Standard Error)</td>
<td>Percentage Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STATEHOOD</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.39731 (0.67765)</td>
<td>1.2497 (1.3255)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIAL VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Income</td>
<td>-0.17537 (0.22267)</td>
<td>-0.45096 (0.49376)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Income</td>
<td>0.19381 (0.32453)</td>
<td>-0.61296 (0.52679)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.21491 (0.28542)</td>
<td>1.9809 (0.58179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.31989 (0.26839)</td>
<td>-1.6234 (0.62636)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>-0.24640 (0.16691)</td>
<td>-0.49250 (0.33945)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born Outside of P.R.</td>
<td>0.35816 (0.37480)</td>
<td>-0.09366 (0.73332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Lived in U.S.</td>
<td>0.31900 (0.16937)</td>
<td>0.61616 (0.36312)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Dweller</td>
<td>0.38156 (0.19450)</td>
<td>1.0280 (0.43777)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Poor</td>
<td>-0.11650 (0.27529)</td>
<td>-0.57726 (0.64707)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receives Food Stamps</td>
<td>0.30397 (0.20355)</td>
<td>0.45036 (0.43256)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDEOLOGICAL VARIABLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Citizenship</td>
<td>0.84828 (0.24738)</td>
<td>-0.92060 (0.38234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communism</td>
<td>0.42505 (0.23647)</td>
<td>-0.68875 (0.39382)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Protection</td>
<td>0.55180 (0.33476)</td>
<td>-1.4029 (0.45924)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>0.87512 (0.22188)</td>
<td>0.11820 (0.40119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Pride</td>
<td>-0.57596 (0.24261)</td>
<td>0.24279 (0.52614)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Pride</td>
<td>-1.5477 (0.49354)</td>
<td>0.25430 (1.0410)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ N = 776 \quad X^2 = 198.9379 \quad \text{Sig=0.000} \]

** Significant to p < .01  * Significant to p < .10  \* Significant to p < .15

Source: Hispania Survey

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contribution. This could well be a reflection of the feeling of economic dependence in the United States on the part of statehood supporters. Perhaps more telling, pride (or lack thereof) in the Puerto Rican Olympic athletes had a particularly important impact on status choice (31%). One is left to wonder about the myth of national sports pride in Puerto Rico. Perhaps it is time to evaluate if all Puerto Ricans feel equally eager and proud when its national basketball team faces the U.S. team.

In the case of independence, eight variables were statistically significant when that status option was compared to Commonwealth. As expected, Independence is partly (but not completely) an elite phenomenon: urban dwellers (but not urban poor) and highly educated, tended to favor independence over Commonwealth. Holding everything else equal, those who completed a bachelor’s degree or achieved a higher degree of education were 17 percent (the largest impact of all social variables) more likely to favor independence versus Commonwealth than those with an intermediate level of education (9th grade) or less. In addition, those who lived in the city were 7 percent more likely to favor independence. Also, those who had lived in the United States and were young were 5 and 13 percent respectively more likely to favor independence than Commonwealth in comparison those who had never lived outside Puerto Rico or were old. As we mentioned before, women were less likely to support independence than Commonwealth.

Security and pride variables also distinguished supporters of independence and Commonwealth. As in the case of statehood, fear of losing the American citizenship was significant, but in the reverse direction and in a much weaker way. Those that were afraid of losing their citizenship were 9 percent less likely of supporting independence. Supporters of Commonwealth were also more interested in the security provided by the U.S. Those who said that they felt that the U.S. protected them were 15 percent more likely to support Commonwealth over independence. Finally, those who were afraid of Communism were 6 percent
more likely to support Commonwealth than independence. Again, it is important to note than there were no statistically significant differences between the two status options in relation to the three pride variables.

Conclusion

In this paper we set out to understand why some Puerto Ricans choose to support statehood, others Commonwealth and others independence. We wanted to provide an explanation that made sense theoretically and that had empirical support. In terms of social groups, our hypothesis was that supporters of statehood would come from groups that needed some sense of security. The poor, those that received aids such as food stamps, those with low levels of education, and those who were middle aged or older, we suggested, were some of the groups that needed a stronger sense of security, be it economic or psychological.

Supporters of independence would be in a different position. They would have come from a more privileged background that provided them with resources such as education so they would not feel the need to have their security assured. Also those who come from more urban backgrounds are stronger supporters of statehood and independence, whereas supporters of Commonwealth would be more disproportionally rural because of the PPD’s roots.

The data here presented lends some support to the relationship between the need for security and the social groups that favor each of the status formulas. The groups that, on average, gave a higher level of support to the integrationist formula received food stamps were from a more urban setting when compared to supporters of Commonwealth. On the other hand, some groups that have a higher level of security, such as those with a high level of education and who were young, tended to support independence over Commonwealth. As we mentioned earlier, those who are young generally have less responsibilities, and the security issue should be less important to them than those who are middle or
old aged.

Two other demographic variables deserve special mention. Women were somewhat more likely to support Commonwealth as opposed to statehood or independence. Perhaps women are less likely to favor change than men, Commonwealth being the status quo, or as we said in the beginning, simply perceive the status problem from a different perspective than men. This finding should stimulate further inquiry into the relationship between gender and political choice in Puerto Rico. Another variable that has similar impact in those who support statehood and independence is having lived in the United States. This is evidently a polarizing variable, in the sense that this experience influences Puerto Ricans to either want closer ties to the United States or complete independence for the island. Unfortunately there are too few cases in this category to do a more detailed analysis here.

In ideological terms, we argued that the traditional perspective of status choice would predict significant differences, especially in terms of ideology, between those who support each of the three status formulas. The autonomy perspective would predict few such differences, since all Puerto Ricans feel proud of their nation and symbols, while feeling comfortable with the security that the relationship with the U.S. supposedly guarantees. The data was clear on this point: there are consistent and significant differences, both statistically and substantively, between the different status formulas.

It is important to note that the results presented here are very robust. Because they were the results of equations, the data presented here mean that the impact of each variable stood even while controlling for all other variables. Thus the effect of third variables is eliminated. This may account for less spectacular percentages than those obtained by bivariate tables, where there are no controls for the intervening effects of other variables.

Finally a comment must be made on the issues of Vieques and Roosevelt Roads. The way that estadista and estadolibrista leaders and followers have behaved in relation to the closing of the Navy’s
bombing range at the island of Vieques, and its departure from the Roosevelt Roads base would seem to contradict some of the findings in this study, especially those in relation to the safety offered by the U.S. We must keep in mind, however, the historical period in which the data was collected. In 1991 we were at the close of the cold war. After many decades of a fearful cold war discourse, aggravated in Puerto Rico by the “Fidel-next-door” issue, no one can seriously believe that in just a couple of years those fears would disappear. Vieques and Roosevelt Roads became an issue more than a decade after the end of the cold war and after Cuba ceased to be a threat, real or imaginary, to anyone. The world was certainly very different at the end of the 1990s than at the beginning. The results of this study must be taken in this context.

The challenge now is to study how current demographic trends will alter the relationships described here. As the federal government reduces economic transfers such as food stamps and other aids, the proportion of the population with higher education increases, and a new trend to move away from the densely populated urban areas to smaller towns and rural areas continues, will the old cleavages hold? Ideologically, as the threat of Communism fades and other Latin American democracies consolidate and their economies grow, will the threat of past times against independence as a synonymous of Communism, anarchy or hunger fade as well? With the globalization of culture and trade expansion, will national pride still be an important issue in status choice in the future?

These are interesting questions. For now we can say that social groups, and ideology matters in status choice, and that the debate between national pride and the need for security will continue to influence status choice for the near future. Further study is needed, especially to focus on the ideological nuances within each of the groups, and to investigate if the findings that we uncovered here apply similarly to all.

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________________. 1985. “La base social de la transformación ideológica del Partido Popular en la década del ‘40”. In Cambio y desarrollo en Puerto Rico: La transformación ideológica del Partido Popular


APPENDIX 1

Question Wording for Ideological Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Original Phrasing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>“I am afraid of loosing my American citizenship.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communism</td>
<td>“I am afraid of Communists.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Protection</td>
<td>“The United States protects Puerto Rico and other countries.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pride</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>“I feel proud of the contribution of Puerto Ricans to our economic development.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic</td>
<td>“I feel proud of our Olympic representation.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language (Spanish)</td>
<td>“I like to speak English.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

1. The authors wish to thank the two anonymous Caribbean Studies’ readers who commented on this work. They are especially thankful to Ángel Israel Rivera for his comments and suggestions. In the end, we bear all responsibility for the analyses presented here.

2. Olga Rosas Cintrón is a Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University alumni.

3. The literal translation of Estado Libre Asociado is “Free Associated State”, although the more common translation is simply Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. In this article the terms Commonwealth and ELA will be used interchangeably, since they have the same political meaning.

4. In 1998 another referendum was held. This time, supporters of the Commonwealth status boycotted the referendum by urging citizens to vote under the “None of the above” column. This was the choice that prevailed.

5. In the 1993 referendum, the ELA received 48.6% of the vote, followed by 46.3% for statehood and 4.4% for independence. We must mention that although supporters of independence constitute a minority of the population, the result of this status formula is under represented since several pro-independence groups boycotted the vote.

6. García Passalacqua and Heine (1991) highlight this problem when they say
“...the available literature on Puerto Rican politics does little to illuminate the interaction between the social and the political”. (p. 246)

Although, as recent events in Argentina and Venezuela, such turmoil has by no means disappeared.

The authors wish to thank Pablo José Rivera, president of the Hispania Research Corporation, and the Puerto Rican Independence Party, which own the rights to the dataset, for allowing us to use this survey.

These percentages may be somewhat different from the percentage distributions of status support displayed by other studies because of the different way that they were calculated (not the traditional way). These differences do not mean that this dataset is not based on a representative sample.

We considered the possibility of creating two scales, one using the three security variables and one using the three pride variables, but abandoned the idea because the inter variable correlations and the scales reliability coefficients were all low.

Again, since we believe that Communism was relevant in 1991, we have to include it in the equation, even if it is no longer relevant. Such omission would cause the equation to be misspecified.

Because of the non-linear nature of the logit (and other probabilistic models of choice) there is no obvious straightforward way to estimate marginal effects, as is possible with linear regression. In this paper we have chosen to estimate the maximum possible effect of the independent variables because it permits us to directly compare their potential impact on the vote. We do so as follows:

1. Using the estimated coefficients, compute the log of the odds of observing choice \( j \) for each voter \( i \) setting the independent variable to it's lowest value

2. Convert the log of the odds to a probability \( P(j_0) \)

3. Repeat steps 1-2 setting the variable to it's highest value so that we obtain \( P(j_1) \)

4. Compute the difference \( P(j_1) - P(j_0) \) for each case

5. Compute the average of the differences across cases.

The average of the difference is the estimate for the marginal effect of that variable.

While in 1950 transfers accounted for 12 percent of personal income, by 1970 they had increased to 20 percent, and by 1980 to 30 percent. In 1974, during their first year of introduction in Puerto Rico, food stamps became an important source of income for two thirds of Puerto Rican families (Dietz 1989).

Because Puerto Rico is not a U.S. state it receives less money in transfers and programs than if it were a state. This is based on the Federal judicial
doctrine that Puerto Rico belongs to, but is not part of the United States (De Lima v. Bidwell 1901; Downes v. Bidwell 1901 and Balzac vs. People of Puerto Rico 1922) See Trías Monge 1997.

Translated to English by the authors from a Spanish translation in García Passalacqua and Rivera Lugo 1990:25.

There were 6 original income categories. To create the income dummies, the lower two income groups were joined as the base ($624 a month or less). Middle income was defined as those with monthly incomes between $625 and $2,083 a month. Those with incomes above $2,084 (the highest category offered in the original questionnaire) were coded as having high incomes.